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A Restrained Paillier Cryptosystem and Its
Applications for Access Control of Common Secret
Xiaojuan Dong, Weiming Zhang, Mohsin Shah, Bei Wang, Nenghai Yu
Abstract—The modified Paillier cryptosystem has become ex-
tremely popular and applied in many fields, owning to its additive
homomorphism. This cryptosystem provides weak private keys
and a strong private key. A weak private key only can decrypt
ciphertexts under the corresponding public key. The strong
private key can decrypt all ciphertexts even under different
public keys. When the modified Paillier cryptosystem is applied
in a system, the member, often the system administrator, has the
strong private key and can decrypt all ciphertexts. If this system
administrator is attacked or compromised, the security of the
application system absolutely break down. Thus, it is important
to stop the decryption of the strong private key. To address this
issue, we propose an restrained version of the modified Paillier
cryptosystem (Restrained-Paillier), by endowing the multiplica-
tive homomorphism. We perform the additive encryption on
the multiplicative ciphertext and generate the mixed ciphertext,
which can not be decrypted by the strong private key. Based on
this Restrained-Paillier, we develop two applications. Firstly, we
realize access control of common secret of two owners. In our
scheme, only one owner cannot access secret. Secondly, we present
three protocols for identity distribution and key management,
identity authentication and private key recovery. Security analysis
shows that the Restrained-Paillier cryptosystem can resist the
chosen plaintext attack. The experimental results illustrate the
utility and efficiency of the proposed protocols.
Index Terms—Homomorphic Encryption; Privacy Preserving;
Access Control; Identity Certificates.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENCRYPTION technology is commonly used to protectconfidentiality of data. There are two kinds of encryption
technology, one kind is the symmetric encryption like DES [1],
and the other kind is the public key encryption like RSA [2].
However, symmetric encryption does not support mathematical
operations on encrypted data. In order to perform useful
operations on encrypted data, we would decrypt the encrypted
data, perform the required operations, and then encrypt the
calculation result, which is inconvenient. Fortunately, homo-
morphic encryption, a kind of public key encryption, allows
mathematical operations on encrypted data without exposing
private information.
Now, homomorphic encryption is popular in many fields.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows arbitrary com-
putations over ciphertexts. But, FHE has high time and space
complexity so it is not yet efficient enough to be implemented
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on real systems [3]. Partially multiplicative homomorphic
encryption schemes, such as RSA cryptosystem [2], allow
multiplication of plaintext data in the ciphertext domain.
Partially additive homomorphic encryption schemes support
some additive calculations over ciphertexts. The Paillier cryp-
tosystem [4] is an additive homomorphic encryption scheme.
In the Paillier cryptosystem, a module N is used for only a
user, accompanied by a decryption key λ. Cramer and Shoup
[5] proposed a variant of the Paillier cryptosystem, where a
module N can be used for a group. Members of the group
can communicate and perform multi-party security calculation
in a common module N . Each member of the group has a
decryption key θ, while the varied Paillier cryptosystem has the
inherent decryption key λ. θ is called as the weak decryption
key as it only can decrypt its corresponding owner’s ciphertext.
λ is called as the strong key since it can decrypt all ciphertext.
Bresson et al. in [6] simplified the scheme in [5] and their
cryptosystem works in the cyclic group of quadratic residues
modulo N2.
Many researchers have applied the modified Paillier in [6]
cryptosystem to their schemes, especially with multiple parties
involved. Multiple parties can perform ciphertext calculation,
ciphertext search and so on, while protecting privacy data. For
instance, Mohanty et al. in [7] proposed a modified Paillier
cryptosystem-based image processing scheme, where a image
outsourcer, a cloud server and an image user were involved.
The cloud server in [7] can perform scaling and cropping
operations over encrypted images with the help of the image
outsourcer and the image user. Ayday et al. in [8] introduced a
privacy-preserving disease susceptibility test. The the system
administrator, patients and the pharmaceutical company were
involved. The genomic privacy of a patient were preserved
from the pharmaceutical company, via the encryption under the
patient’s public key. However, the system administrator, who
had the strong key, may be compromised to the pharmaceutical
company for benefits. As a result, the pharmaceutical company
could obtain the all patients’ genomic data.
The strong key leakage is a threat to the modified Paillier
cryptosystem. To solve the issue, Liu et al. in [9] split the
strong private key into different shares. One share was send
to a cloud platform (CP) and the other share was sent to a
computation service provider (CSP). Only one split key could
not allow decryption. The authors in [9] did not discuss that
the CP and the CSP conspired in order to decrypt user’s
data. Moreover, they assumed that the Key Generation Center
(KGC) was a trusted party so that the KGC could be tasked
with the distribution and management of private keys in the
system. Nevertheless, this assumption is unreasonable since
2the MA may reveal private keys for benefits or being invaded
by skilled attackers.
The exposure of strong key can destroy the security of the
system. However, the strong key λ can not be abandoned
because λ is an inherent part of the modified Paillier cryp-
tosystem. In this paper, we propose to restrain the decryption
ability of the strong key. Based on this idea, we propose
an restrained version of the modified Paillier cryptosystem
(Restrained-Paillier). In the Restrained-Paillier system, the
multiplicative ciphertext is added. We perform the additive
encryption on the multiplicative ciphertext and generate the
mixed ciphertext. The strong private key λ is used to decrypt
the mixed ciphertext, obtaining the multiplicative ciphertext.
But the λ can not decrypt the multiplicative ciphertext to get
the plaintext data. The multiplicative ciphertext only can be
decrypted by its corresponding weak key θ. Hence, a party has
the strong key λ and still fail to decrypt the mixed ciphertext
data. We regard the KGC as a semi-trusted party. The KGC
can manage both public and private keys, but can not obtain
private keys. Specifically, the major contribution of this paper
can be summarized below.
• First, the Restrained-Paillier cryptosystem supports mixed
ciphertexts, which are generated by executing the additive
encryption on the multiplicative ciphertexts. The strong
key decrypts the mixed ciphertexts, only getting the
multiplicative ciphertexts but not the plaintext data.
• Second, we use the property of mixed ciphertext to realize
access control to common secrets belonging to two owner.
No one can obtain the the secret by oneself. Besides, a
owner can control the other owner’s information obtained
form their common secret.
• Third, based on the Restrained-Paillier cryptosystem, we
present three associated protocols for achieving identity
distribution and key management, identity authentication,
and private key recovery. The key management protocol
can prevent the private key exposure. If some one lost
his/her private key, the private key recovery protocol can
recover the key.
• Fourth, we give security analysis that the Restrained-
Paillier cryptosystem can resist the chosen plaintext at-
tack. The proposed protocols can achieve security re-
quirements.
• Fifth, we analyze the communication and computation
overheads of the Restrained-Paillier cryptosystem and
protocols. We examine these overheads by building a sim-
ulator in Java to demonstrate the utility of our proposals.
A. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the related preliminaries and the relevant back-
ground materials. In Section III, we present the Restrained-
Paillier cryptosystem. In Section IV, we present four protocols,
three of which is about key key management and Identity cer-
tificate, the last one is about access control to common secrets.
In Section V, we give the security analysis of our proposals.
In Section VI, performance of simulator is evaluated. Section
VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we review the cryptographic primitives
involved, and the system model, the security requirements of
the proposed protocols in this paper.
A. Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we introduce typical properties of partially
homomorphic cryptosystems and then review the modified
Paillier cryptosystem in [6] and [5]. For the sake of brevity
and readability, Table I lists some notations used for the rest
of the paper.
TABLE I: Definitions and Notations in the Cryptosystems
Symbols Definition
| · | Bit length
pk, sk Partially homomorphic public & private key
E+
pk
(·) Additive encryption algorithm with public key
E×
pk
(·) Multiplicative encryption algorithm with public key
lcm(x, y) Lowest common multiple between x and y
gcd(x, y) Greatest common divisor between x and y
H(·) Hash Function
1) Partially Homomorphic Cryptosystems: Two additive
ciphertexts E+pk(m1) and E
+
pk(m2) accord with the following
property:
E+pk(m1)× E
+
pk(m2) = E
+
pk(m1 +m2);
Two multiplicative ciphertexts like E×pk(m1) and E
×
pk(m2)
accord with the following property:
E×pk(m1)× E
×
pk(m2) = E
×
pk(m1 ×m2).
3. Private  Key Recovery
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Key Generation
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Fig. 1: System Model.
2) Paillier Cryptosystem: The pubic key is (N, g) with
N |ordN2(g), where N = pq and p and q are two prime
numbers. ordN2(g) is the order of g. The private key λ =
lcm(p − 1, q − 1). To encrypt a message m ∈ ZN , select a
random r ∈ ZN and compute : c = g
m+rN mod N2. The
message can be recovered as: m = L(cλ)/L(gλ) mod N ,
where L(u) = u−1 mod N
2
N
, for all u ∈ {u < N2|u = 1
mod N}.
3) Modified Paillier Cryptosystem: The pubic key is
(N, g, h = gθ mod N2) with ordN2 (g) = λ = 2p
′q′. λ is
the factorization of N = pq (where p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2p′ + 1
are safe primes), and the weak key is θ ∈ [1, N2/2]. Such
a g can be easily found by selecting a random a ∈ Z∗N2
and calculating g = −a2N mod N2. To encrypt a message
m ∈ ZN , select a random r ∈ [1, N/4] and compute : T1 = g
r
mod N2, T2 = h
r(1 +mN) mod N2.
Using the weak key θ, the message can be recovered as:
m = L(T2/T
θ
1 mod N
2). If (p, q) is known, then λ = 2p′q′
3can be calculated. T λ2 = g
λ(N)xr(1 +mλN) = (1 +mλN).
Thus, given that gcd(λ,N) = 1, m can be recovered as: m =
L(T λ2 )λ
−1 mod N .
The difference between the Paillier cryptosystem in [4] and
the modified Paillier cryptosystem in [6] is the number of
users. The Paillier cryptosystem can only be used for one user,
who has the public-private key pair (N, g, λ). The modified
Paillier cryptosystem can be used for a group of users, or an
organization. The member of the organization has the public
and weak private key pair (N, gθ, θ) and only can decrypt the
ciphertext under gθ , while the organization manager has the
public and strong private key pair (N, g, λ) and can decrypt
any ciphertext.
B. System Model & Security Requirement
1) System Model: The system model consists of three
participants: a KGC, a User Ui and a User Uj , as illustrated
in Fig. 1.
KGC: The semi-trusted KGC is tasked with the key manage-
ment and the distribution of identity certificates in the system.
The KGC is curious-but-honest, which strictly follows the
protocols, but also interested to learn private keys belonging
to users.
Ui: The Ui registers in the system, sends his/hert hidden key
to the KGC and asks the KGC for his/her identity certificate.
When the Ui’s private key is lost, Ui’s can recover his/her key
with the the cooperation of the KGC.
Uj: The Uj , a registered user, authenticates the Ui’s iden-
tity before their communication. There is a common secret
between Ui and Uj . But no one can open the secret by oneself.
Only with the permission of Ui, Uj can get secrets and vice
versa.
2) Design Goals: To efficiently support key protection,
identity authentication and access control of common secret,
our work is designed to achieve the following goals:
• Access Control of Common Secret. A common secret
belongs to two users. One user cannot open the secret
without the permission of his/her companion.
• Protection of Private Keys. To present the KGC knows
participants’ private keys, private keys are unavailable to
the KGC.
• Correctness of Identity Certificates. To guarantee that
when a user sends his/her true identity certificate to the
other user, the identity certificate can pass the verification
of the other user.
• Soundness of Identity Certificates. Assure that cor-
rupted identity certificates cannot pass verification.
• Unforgeability of Identity Certificates. A passive ad-
versary has public keys, but cannot forge a certificate of
his chosen identity.
• Existential Unforgeability Against Adaptive Chosen
Messages Attacks. An active adversary can access a
certificate oracle, which can generate legitimate identity
certificates. The adversary’s goal is to generate a legiti-
mate identity certificate of an identity, which cannot has
been asked the certificate oracle before. Thus, this active
adversary win. To stop an active adversary, our proposals
are under existential unforgeability.
• Recovery of Lost Private Keys. When a user loses
his/her private key, the key can be restored.
III. RESTRAINED-PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
The strong key λ of the modified Paillier system can decrypt
all ciphertexts. This threatens the security of this system since
λ may be compromised. In order to address this issue, we en-
dow a multiplicative homomorphic encryption to the modified
Paillier, yielding mixed ciphertexts. The mixed ciphertexts are
obtained by additively encrypting the multiplicative cipher-
texts. λ cannot disclose the mixed ciphertexts. The details of
the Restrained-Paillier cryptosystem are described as follows.
Key Generation (KeyGen): The public key is (N, g, h =
gθ mod N) with the base g (where p = 2p′+1, q = 2q′+1
are safe primes). The strong key is λ, and the weak private
key θ ∈ [1, N2/2]. Such a g can be obtained by select a
random a ∈ Z∗
N2
but a 6= 1 mod N and computing g =
−a2N mod N . The base g meets gλ mod N = 1 and gNλ
mod N2 = 1, proved in Appendix A. The user Uis’ a pair of
public and private key is denoted as (pki, ski). The user Uj’s
a pair of keys is denoted as (pkj , skj).
Additive Encryption (AddEnc): Given a message m ∈
ZN , choose a random r ∈ [0, N/4] and output the additive
ciphertext as E+pk(m) = {AC1, AC2}, where AC1 = (h
r
mod N)N (1 +mN) mod N2; AC2 = g
r mod N .
Additive Decryption with Weak Private Key (Ad-
dDecWkey): An additive ciphertext as E+pk(m) can be de-
crypted with private key sk = θ by calculating: m =
L{ AC1
[(AC2)
θ mod N ]N
}.
Additive Decryption with Strong Private Key (Ad-
dDecSkey): Use the strong key to decrypt E+pk(m), m is
calculated as :m = L[(AC1)
λ
mod N2]λ−1 mod N , since
gcd(λ,N) = 1. The specific proofs are shown in Appendix
A.
Strong Private Key Splitting (SkeyS): According to the
Chinese remainder theorem [10], split the strong private key
λ into two partial strong private keys. One, denoted as λi, is
sent to a party i; the other one, denoted as λj , is sent to a
party j. λi and λj meet the following two constraints:{
λi + λj = 0 mod λ,
λ1 + λj = 1 mod N.
Additive Decryption with Partial Strong Private Key
Step One (AddDecPSkey1): The Ui runs the algorithm.
Exploiting the partial strong private key λi, the partial de-
crypted ciphertext DC1 of E
+
pk(m) can be calculated as:
DC1 = (AC1)
λi = gλi·rθ(1 + λimN) mod N
2. The Ui
forwards {E+pk(m), DC1} to the Uj .
Additive Decryption with Partial Strong Private Key
Step Two (AddDecPSkey2): This algorithm is run in the
Uj’s side. Given {E
+
pk(m), DC1} and λj , the partial decrypted
ciphertext DC2 can be calculated as: DC2 = (AC1)
λj =
gλj ·rθ(1 + λjmN) mod N
2. Then, the original message m
can be recovered as: m = L[DC1 ·DC2]. The specific proof
is in Appendix B.
Multiplicative Encryption (MulEnc): Given a message
m ∈ ZN , choose a random number r ∈ [1, N/4] and output the
4multiplicative ciphertext as E×pk(m) = {MC1,MC2}, where
MC1 = mg
rθ mod N ; MC2 = g
r mod N .
Multiplicative Decryption (MulDec): The multiplicative
ciphertext E×pk(m) can be decrypted with the private key sk =
θ by calculating : m = MC1(MC2)θ mod N .
Seen from the AddDecSkey algorithm, our strong key λ still
can arbitrarily decrypt the additive ciphertext E+pk(m). Thus,
the additive ciphertext cannot be used directly. We investigate
the approach inspired by [16]. Given a message m, we first
run the MulEnc algorithm and acquire the multiplicative
ciphertext E×pk(m), on which we next execute the AddEnc al-
gorithm, and consequently we get a mixed cipheretex denoted
as E∗pk(m), where ∗ indicates that a multiplicative ciphertext is
transformed to a mixed ciphertext. Consequently, an attacker,
who gets λ, can only decrypt E∗pk(m)and get E
×
pk(m), but
not the original message m. The joint key of the Ui and
the Uj is hij = g
θiθj mod N . This mixing process can be
executed between the Ui and the Uj as Fig. 2. We introduce
the MultoMix algorithm as follows.
A Multiplicative Ciphertext to A Mixed Ciphertext
(MultoMix):
Step-1 (@Ui): Ui gives Uj a multiplicative ciphertext
E×pkij (m) = {MCij,1, Cij,2}, where MCij,1 = mh
r
ij
mod N ; Cij,2 = g
r mod N .
Step-2 (@Uj): Uj randomly chooses a random r
′, runs
the AddEnc algorithm, and outputs the mixed cipher-
text E∗pkij (m) as: E
∗
pkij
(m) = {MixCij,1,MixCij,2},
where MixCij,1 = (h
r′
ij mod N)
N (1 +mhrijN) mod N
2;
MixCij,2 = Cij,2 = g
r mod N .
Considering the mixed ciphertextE∗pk(m), ifmh
r
ij mod N
is denoted as m′, E∗pk(m) can be rewritten as :E
∗
pk(m) =
{MixC1,MixC2}, where MixC1 = (h
r′
ij mod N)
N (1 +
m′N) mod N2; MixC2 = C2 = g
r mod N . The mixed
ciphertext actually is a variant of an additive ciphertext. If we
use the generator g of the Paillier Cryptosystem, the message
mhrij mod N
2 ∈ ZN2 is not bounded by ZN . So the Paillier
cryptosystem does not hold the MultoMix algorithm.
To convert a mixed ciphertext to an additive ciphertext, the
process that a mixed ciphertext is transformed to an additive
ciphertext is given as Fig. 3. We bring in the MixtoAdd
algorithm as follows.
A Mixed Ciphertext to An Additive Ciphertext (Mix-
toAdd):
Step-1 (@Uj): Given a mixed ciphertext
E∗pkij (m) = {MixCij,1,MixCij,2}, whereMixCij,1 = (h
r′
ij
mod N)N (1 +mhrijN) mod N
2; MixCij,2 = g
r mod N ,
Uj chooses a random number s ∈ Z2p′q′ , and computes
t1 = (MixCij,2 · g
θj )
s
= g(r+s)θj mod N and t2 = g
s
mod N . Uj sends {MixCij,1, t1, t2} to Ui.
Step-2 (@Ui): Once t1 is received, Ui
first computes (t1)
θi = g(r+s)θiθj = h
(r+s)
ij
mod N and its inverse [h
(r+s)
ij ]
−1 mod N , which
Ui uses to calculate (MixCij)
′ as follows:
(MixCij,1)
′
= (MixCij,1)
[h
(r+s)
ij ]
−1
mod N2
= (hr
′
ij mod N)
[h
(r+s)
ij ]
−1N (1 +mhrij · [h
(r+s)
ij ]
−1N) mod N2
= (hr
′
ij mod N)
[h
(r+s)
ij ]
−1N [1 +m(hsij)
−1
N ] mod N2.
Then, i computes T2 = (t2)
θi = gsθi mod N , and forwards
{(MixCij,1)
′, T2} to j.
Step-3 (@Uj): After receiving T2, Uj uses it to
compute a middle result (T2)
′ = (T2)
θj = hsij mod N .
Next, the additive ciphertext E+pkij (m) is computed as:
E+pkij (m)
= [(MixCij,1)
′](T2)
′
= (hr
′
ij mod N)
[h
(r+s)
ij ]
−1
·hsijN [1 +m(hsij)
−1
· hsijN ] mod N
2
= (hr
′
ij mod N)
(hrij)
−1N (1 +mN) mod N2.
IV. A SIMPLE APPLICATION OF RESTRAINED-PAILLIER
CRYPTOSYSTEM
Ui and Uj employ the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Agreement [15] to produce their joint public key
hij = g
θiθj mod N . The common secret S between Ui
and Uj is encrypted under the joint key hij , producing
E∗pkij (S) = {((hij)
r mod N)N (1 + S(hij)
rmN)
mod N2; grm mod N}. Uj obtains the secret S on
multiples of the number b ∈ [1, N/8]. Besides, Ui controls
the access result using a control factor c ∈ [1, N/8]. Uj gets
the secret bS + c. The specific process seen in Fig. 4, is
described as follows.
A. Access Control of Common Secret Protocol (ACCS)
Step-1 (@Uj): (1) The Uj chooses a and d from [1,
N
4 ],
and calculatesA = (hij)
a
mod N , dA−1 and t1 = g
θj(rm+a)
mod N . The parameter d can hide A−1.
(2) The Uj calculates E
∗
pkij
(bdS) = [E∗pkij (S)]
bd. The Uj
keeps A secret and sends {t1, dA
−1, E∗pkij (bd ·S)} to the Ui.
Step-2 (@Ui): (1) The Uj computes t2 = (t1)
θi =
(hij)
(rm+a) mod N and its inverse t3 = (t2)
−1
=
[(hij)
(rm+a)]−1 mod N .
(2) The Uj computes cdh
rm
ij = c·dA
−1 ·t2 and E
∗
pkij
(bdS+
cd) = [E∗pkij (bdS)] · (1 + cdh
rm
ij ·N).
(3) The Ui computes E
∗
pkij
[(bdS + cd) · A−1] =
[E∗pkij (bdS + cd)]
t3 . For simplicity, E∗pkij [(bdS + cd) · A
−1]
is denoted as Resluti.
(4) The Ui sends to the Uj {Resluti, (Resluti)
λi}.
Step-3 (@Uj): (1) The Uj obtains bdS + cd as:
bdS + cd = AddDecPSkey2((Resluti)
A, [(Resluti)
λi ]A, λj).
(2) The Uj obtains bS + c = (bdS + cd)/d.
V. THREE PROTOCOLS FOR KEY MANAGEMENT AND
IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION
The Paillier cryptosystem [4] is used for a single user
because the Paillier only has a private key λ. The modified
Paillier cryptosystem in [6] and the proposed cryptosystem
have the special characteristic that there is a strong private
key and many weak keys. Because of the characteristic, the
modified Paillier and the proposed cryptosystem can be used
for multi-user systems. Weak private keys are individually
distributed to users while the system manager has the only
5Fig. 2: A Multiplicative Ciphertext to A Mixed Ciphertext (MultoMix).
Fig. 3: A Mixed Ciphertext to An Additive Ciphertext (MixtoAdd).
strong private key. In multi-user systems, key distribution and
identity authentication are two important security issues.
We investigate the characteristic of the modified Paillier and
the proposed cryptosystem to present three protocols for key
management and identity authentication. We discuss the case
where the KGC is a semi-trusted party and cannot know about
each user’s weak key. The weak key is processed by the it’s
user before sent to the KGC. When the user loses his/her weak
key, he/she can take back the weak key from the KGC. We
use one split part of the strong key to produce the identity
certificates, and use the other split part to validate identity
certificates. See the following protocols for details.
A. Identity Distribution and Key Management(IdDis & Key-
Man) Protocol
The KGC has no access to private keys of parties. For
example, the Ui’s private key is generated and hidden. Then,
the Ui’s hidden key is regarded as the registration request,
which is sent to the KGC. The KGC creates a unique identity
IDi, and uses it to generate an identity certificate Certi. The
KGC returns {IDi, Certi} to Ui. The KGC uses the SkeyS
algorithm to produce a pair of split keys (sigk, verk), where
sigk is used for signing Cert, and verk is public for verifying
Cert. When the Ui enrolls in the system, the IdDis& KeyMan
protocol, seen as Fig. 5, is implemented as follows.
Step-1 (@Ui): The Ui chooses θi from [1, N
2/4] and ri
from [1, N/4], computes hi = g
θi mod N as Ui’s public
key, calculates θri = θi +H(ri) and preserves it as a secret.
After that Ui calculates Regi = (g
θri mod N)N (1 + riN)
mod N2 and transmits it to the KGC as a registration request.
Step-2 (@KGC): Once Regi is received, the KGC assigns
a unique identity IDi from [1, N
2/4] and produces a identity
certificate Certi by running the AddDecPSkey1 algorithm as:
Certi = {Certi,1, Certi,2}.
Certi,1 = (g
IDi mod N)NRegi mod N
2
= (gθri+IDi mod N)N (1 + riN) mod N
2.
Certi,2 = (Certi,1)
sigk mod N2.
The KGC stores {IDi, Certi} on its servers and returns
{IDi, Certi} to the Ui.
B. Identity Authentication (IdAuth) Protocol
Before interaction, the Uj verifies the Ui’s identity through
running the IdAuth protocol, seen as Fig. 6. This process is
executed as follows.
Step-1 (@Uj): The Uj sends the Ui a request for identity
authentication.
Step-2 (@Ui): The Ui returns {hi, IDi, Certi} to the Uj .
Step-3 (@Uj): The Uj executes the AddDecPSkey2 al-
gorithm on Certi using the verification key verk, and
obtains ri. The Ui uses it to compute H(ri), and com-
putes gH(ri) mod N . Then, Uj checks whether the equation
Certi,1
(higH(ri)+IDi mod N)N (1+riN) mod N2
=1 holds. If it holds,
the Uj is safe in the knowledge of the Ui’s identity. Otherwise,
the Uj firmly refuses the Ui’s request.
6Fig. 4: ACCS Protocol.
Fig. 5: IdDis & KeyMan Protocol.
Fig. 6: IdAuth Protocol.
C. Private Key Recovery(PriKeyRec) Protocol
If the Ui carelessly loses his/her own private key θi, the Ui
can recover θi by running the PriKeyRec protocol, seen as
Fig. 7. This process is described as follows.
Step-1 (@Ui): The Ui issues a key recovery request IDi
to the KGC.
Step-2 (@KGC): Once the key recovery request is re-
ceived, the KGC runs the AddDecSkey algorithm on Certi,1
and gets a result, denoted as ri and sent to to the Ui.
Step-3 (@i): The Ui uses ri to compute H(ri), and com-
putes gH(ri) mod N . Then Ui verifies whether the formula
gθri = hi ·g
H(ri) mod N is correct. If not, the Ui dispatches
an error in calculation of ri to the KGC, and Step 2 and Step
3 are re-executed. Otherwise, the Ui believes that ri is correct
and takes out θi by calculating θi = θri −H(ri).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the security of the
Restrained-Paillier, before demonstrating the security of four
protocols. One protocol is used to achieving the access control
of common secret between two users. Other three protocols
are used to realize secure key management and identity
authentication.
A. Security of Restrained-Paillier
Multiplicative ciphertexts of the Restrained-Paillier are
secure under the INDistinguishable under Chosen Plain-
text Attack (IND-CPA) model since the multiplicative ci-
phertexts same to those of the ElGamal scheme [12].
The additive ciphertext of the Restrained-Paillier, formulated
as {(hr mod N)N (1 + mN) mod N2; gr mod N}, has
a N-power calculation more than those of the modified
7Fig. 7: PriKeyRec Protocol.
Paillier cryptosystem in [6], formulated as {hr(1 + mN)
mod N2; gr mod N2}. The security of additive ciphertexts
of the Restrained-Paillier is still guaranteed. We give the secure
analysis of our additive ciphertexts as follows.
Against Additive Ciphertexts Analysis:
The security of additive ciphertexts in the Restrained-Paillier
can resist Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) [11] based on
the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption in
[4]. Let N = pq be the product of two safe primes. The
DCR assumption approximately claims that the set of N-th
powers modulo N2 is computationally indistinguishable from
the uniform distribution modulo N2, i.e.,
Definition 1 (DCR Assumption) The Decisional
Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption states that {xN
mod N2 : x ∈ Z∗N2}
C
≈
{x : x ∈ Z∗N2}, where
C
≈
denotes
computational indistinguishability.
Theorem 1. If the DCR assumption holds, additive cipher-
texts are secure under the INDistinguishable Chosen Plaintext
Attack (IND-CPA).
Proof: Assume that a polynomial time distinguisher A
chooses the messages m0 and m1 and sends them to a
challenger C. The public key is first set as (N, g, h) where
h = gα mod N . C flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1}, randomly
chooses r and encrypts the data mµ, obtaining {cµ = [(g
αr
mod N)]N (1+mµN) mod N
2, gr mod N} that is returned
to A.
In A’s side, cµ is the ciphertext of m0 if and only if
cµ
1+m0N
= (gαr mod N)N mod N2 is a N-th residue as
gαr mod N ∈ Z∗N ∈ Z
∗
N2 . Therefore, a successful chosen-
plaintext attacker could decide composite residuosity, and
vice-versa.
Against the MultoMix and MixtoAdd algorithms Anal-
ysis:
The MultoMix and MixtoAdd algorithms are secure under
the IND-CPA model because the two algorithms are based on
the AddEnc and MulEnc algorithms.
Against Splitting of the String Key Analysis:
The privacy of divided private key is guaranteed by the
Shamir secret sharing scheme [13]. The strong private is
randomly split into two shares in a way that any less than
two shares cannot recover the original strong key. It further
implies that the adversary cannot recover the original secret
(the strong key) even the adversary gets the one share.
B. Security of the ACCS Protocol
The ciphertexts are secure under the IND-CPA model. The
Ui and Uj can not use the extra data < A, t1, t2, t3 > to
decrypt ciphertexts, even though they have λ. t2 is used to
present Ui from computing h
rm
ij . Besides, dA
−1 is used to
present Ui from computing h
rm
ij = A
−1 · t2 mod N . Thus,
the Ui, who has gotten λ, figures out S(hij)
rm from the mixed
ciphertext E∗pkij (S), but cannot decrypt S(hij)
rm with t2 =
(hij)
(rm+a) or dhrmij .
C. Security of Three Key and Identity Protocols
Theorem 2. For a passive adversary A, the identity certifi-
cates in three protocols for key and identity are unforgeable.
A passive adversary A gets the verk that is public for
verifying Cert, but cannot recover the the strong key since the
Shamir secret sharing scheme is information-theoretic secure.
Thus, A can not get the sign key sigk and uses it to generate
the signature of a message he chooses.
Theorem 3. For an active adversary A, the identity certifi-
cates in three protocols for key and identity are secure under
Existential Unforgeability Against Adaptive Chosen Messages
Attacks.
The active adversary A gets Cert1 and Cert2 from the
certificate oracle. But A can not produces a legitimate identity
certificate that can pass validation, because of the properties
of hash functions.
Proof:
Cert1,1 = (g
θ1+H(r1)+ID1 mod N)N (1 + r1N) mod N
2,
Cert1,2 = (Cert1,1)
sigk .
Cert2,1 = (g
θ2+H(r2)+ID2 mod N)N (1 + r2N) mod N
2,
Cert2,2 = (Cert2,1)
sigk .
A uses Cert1 and Cert2 to generate Cert3.
Cert3,1 = R
N (1 + (r1 + r2)N) mod N
2,
Cert3,2 = (Cert3,1)
sigk ,
whereR = gθ1+H(r1)+θ2+H(r2)+ID1+ID2 mod N .
But Cert3 can not pass validation, because of the properties
of hash functions H(r1) +H(r2) 6= H(r1 + r2).
D. Analysis of the Security Requirements
In this subsection, we show that the proposed protocol can
achieve the design goals described in Section II.
Protection of Private Keys: Participants’ private keys are
hidden in the registration requests Reg, identity certificates
Cert, and public keys h. < Reg,Cert, h > are multiplicative
ciphertexts or additive ciphertexts which are secure under the
IND-CPA model.
Correctness of Identity Certificates: Correct identity certifi-
cate can pass the check in the Auth protocol.
Soundness of Identity Certificates: Use the
corrupted identity certificate to get the result
r′ = AddDecPSkey2(Cert, verk). H(r′) 6= H(r) due
to strong collision resistance fails to pass the check in the
Auth protocol.
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ment has been realized in Theorem 2.
Existential Unforgeability Against Adaptive Chosen Mes-
sages Attacks: The security requirement has been realized in
Theorem 3.
Recovery of Lost Private Keys: The private key can be
restored from the identity certificate. The corrupted identity
certificate cannot pass the check in the PriKeyRec protocol.
Access Control of Common Secret: Nobody can decrypt the
encrypted secret by oneself. This has been proved in Security
of the ACCS Protocol.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the communication cost and
computation cost of the Restrained-Pailiier and our protocols.
A. Theoretical Analysis
We assume that one regular exponentiation operation with
an exponent of length |N | requires 1.5|N | multiplications [14]
(i.e. length of r is |N | and that computing gr requires 1.5|N |
multiplications). Since the exponentiation operation brings in
significantly higher cost than the addition and multiplication
operations, we ignore the fixed numbers of addition and
multiplication operations in our analysis.
1) Restrained-Pailiier Cryptosystem: For comparison with
the Paillier, the bit length of random number is chosen
as |r| = |N |/4 and the bit length of private key is set
as |θ| = |N2|/2 ≈ |N |. The AddEnc algorithm in the
Restrained-Pailiier scheme needs 2.25|N | multiplications to
encrypt a message, and the AddDecWkey algorithm consumes
3|N | multiplications to decrypt an aditive ciphertext while the
AddDecSkey algorithm uses up 1.5|N | multiplications. The
overhead comparison between the modified Paillier cryptosys-
tem in [6] and Restrained-Paillier is listed in Table II. The
computation cost of the AddEnc algorithm in the Restrained-
Pailiier is more 1.5|N | than that in the modified Paillier. It
is because the calculation of gN in the Restrained-Pailiier
occupies 1.5|N |.
TABLE II: Cost Comparison between Restrained-Paillier and
Modified Paillier
Restrained− Paillier Paillier
AddEnc 2.25|N | 0.75|N |
AddDecSkey 1.5|N | 1.5|N |
The AddDecPSkey1 algorithm and AddDecPSkey2 algo-
rithm both consume 3|N | multiplications, respectively as both
the length of λ1 and λ2 is 2|N |. The MulEnc algorithm
occupies 0.75|N |multiplications, theMulDec algorithm needs
1.5|N | multiplications. The MultoMix algorithm requires
1.875|N | multiplications and the MixtoAdd algorithm needs
3|N | multiplications.
2) Three Key Management and Identity Protocols: The bit
length of random number is chosen as |r| = |N |/4, the bit
length of private key is set as |θ| = |N2|/4 ≈ |N |/2, the bit
length of identity is set as |ID| = |N2|/4 ≈ |N |/2 and the
bit length of hash function is set as |N |/4.
The computational costs of the three protocols are listed
in Table III with the KGC, Ui and Uj involved. For brief,
we record the communication (Commu.) costs in last row
of Table III. In Table III, the KGC’s computation cost is
1.5|N | multiplications of the module-N’s square, while the
Ui’s computation cost is 1.5|N | multiplications of the module-
N. Hence, the KGC uses more cost than Ui uses.
TABLE III: Costs of Three Key and Identity Protocols
IdDis&KeyMan IdAuth PriKeyRec
KGC 5.25|N | 1.5|N |
Ui 2.625|N | 1.5|N |
Uj 5.625|N |
Commu. 6.5|N | 6|N | 0.75|N |
3) ACCS Protocol: The Uj asks for the common secret
with the help the Ui. The The computational (Compu.) cost
of the ACCS protocol are listed in Table IV. The Uj as the
requester of common secret consumes more than the Ui, the
helper. The communication cost is 8|N |.
TABLE IV: Costs of ACCS Protocol
Ui Uj
Compu. 5.625|N | 8.0625|N |
B. Experimental Analysis
We perform the experiments using a personal computer
powered by an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4490 @3.30GHz pro-
cessor, 8 GB of RAM memory and a Windows 7 professional
operating system. The experimental results are averagely eval-
uated over 1000 times using a custom simulator built in Java.
1) Restrained-Pailiier Cryptosystem: The evaluation of the
computational cost of the Restrained-Pailiier are listed in Table
V. Computation cost increases with increasing |N |. Seen from
Table V, operations on multiplicative ciphertexts cost far less
than operations on additive ciphertexts. When |N | = 1024,
time consumption is acceptable. But when |N | = 2048, time
consumption is too long.
2) Our Protocols: The computational cost of IdDis &
KeyMan protocol is shown in Fig. 8(a). The computational
cost of PrivKeyRec protocol is shown in Fig. 8(b). Seen from
Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), the KGC uses more overhead than Ui
uses. The computation overhead of the PrivKeyRec protocol
is far lower than that of the IdDis & KeyMan protocol.
The computational cost of the IdAuth protocol is listed in
Table VI, where only the verifier needs to do calculations.
The computational cost of the ACCS protocol, shown in Fig.
8(c). The party requesting the common secret Uj costs more
than the than the other party Ui does.
The communication overhead of the four protocol is shown
in Fig. 8(d), where B represents 8 bits. The communication
overhead of the ACCS protocol is highest and the communi-
cation overhead of the PrivKeyRec protocol is lowest, seen
from Fig. 8(d).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We present the Restrained-Paillier cryptosystem, holding
back the decryption of the strong key in the modified Paillier
9TABLE V: The Performance of Restrained-Pailiier with Different |N |/(ms)
Algorithm
|N |
512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
AddEnc 1.398 4.511 9.875 19.743 32.903 50.88 75.209
AddDecSkey 1.108 3.84 8.529 17.284 28.81 44.89 66.343
AddDecWkey 1.664 5.27 11.397 22.55 37.325 57.7057 85.152
AddDecSkey1 2.217 7.59 16.96 34.188 57.402 88.513 130.504
AddDecSkey2 2.191 7.568 16.939 34.172 57.977 88.739 130.623
MulEnc 0.296 0.679 1.397 2.612 4.324 6.792 9.767
MulDec 0.531 1.315 2.634 5.141 8.461 13.557 19.336
TABLE VI: The Performance of the IdAuth Protocol with Different |N |
IdAuth
|N |
512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
Uj(ms) 3.856 10.753 23.97 51.637 87.415 122.662 190.095
Commu. (B) 382.413 575.19 766.523 958.19 1150.640 1342.426 1534.70
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 8: Evaluation findings. (a) Run time of the IdDis & Key Man Protocol (vary with bit length of N ). (b) Run time of
the PriKeyRec Protocol (vary with bit length of N ). (c) Run time of the ACCS Protocol (vary with bit length of N ). (d)
Communication cost of four protocols (vary with bit length of N ).
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cryptosystem. The Restrained-Paillier provides both additive
ciphertexts, multiplicative ciphertexts and mixed ciphertexts.
Mixed ciphertexts can not be decrypted by the strong key.
Using the the property of mixed ciphertext, we propose the
ACCS protocol that can control the access to the common
secret of two users. Moreover, exploiting the property of
Restrained-Paillier, we put forward three protocols about the
distribution of identity certificate, the identity authentication,
key management and retrieval of private keys. Based on the
security of Restrained-Paillier, the security of our protocols
are guaranteed. We have calculated the computation and com-
munication overheads of the Restrained-Paillier, our protocols.
The simulation results show that these protocols use up less
time consumption and low transmission cost. Hence, our
protocols are attractive for practical applications. Future work
will focus on how to apply the Restrained-Paillier onto digital
signatures, especially proxy re-signatures.
APPENDIX A
Select a a ∈ Z∗N2 and a mod N 6= 1. The Euler function
is denoted as ϕ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = 4p′q′. Calculate the
base g as follows.
g = −a2N mod N
= −(a mod N)
2N
mod N
= −(a mod N)
2pq mod ϕ(N)
mod N
= −(a mod N)
2(p−1)(q−1)
mod N
(1)
For simplicity, let γ = (a mod N)2(p−1)(q−1), γ ∈ Z∗N . The
Equation (1) can be rewritten as the Equation (2).
g = −γ2 mod N (2)
Obtain the Equation (3) using the Equation (2).
g
ϕ(N)
2 = gλ = 1 mod N (3)
Since g ∈ Z∗N , g
θr mod N ∈ Z∗N . Let µ = g
θr mod N .
Since N is the product of p and q, N has no primitive root.
µ
ϕ(N)
2 = µ2p
′q′ = µλ = 1 mod N . Obtain µλ = 1 + kN
mod N2(0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1) and the Equation (4).
(µλ)N = (1 + kN)N
= 1 + C1N · kN + · · ·+ C
N
N · (kN)
N
= 1 + kN2 mod N2
= 1 mod N2
(4)
Thus, (gθr mod N)λ mod N2 = 1 mod N2 holds.
APPENDIX B
In the AddDecPSkey2 algorithm, AC(λ1+λ2) = (gθr
mod N)(λ1+λ2)N (1+m(λ1+λ2)N) mod N
2.We will prove
that the method of splitting the strong key λ can make
AddDecPSkey2 algorithm decrypt m.
In the splitting method, λ1 + λ2 ≡ nλ(0 ≤ n ≤ λ− 1) and
λ1 + λ2 ≡ 1 + kN(0 ≤ k ≤ N). We can obtain the Equation
(5).
AC(λ1+λ2) = (gθr mod N)nλN [1 +m(1 + kN)N ]
= [1 +m(1 + kN)N ] mod N2
= 1 +mN +mkN2 mod N2
= 1 +mN mod N2
(5)
The Equation (5) can make m = L[AC(λ1+λ2)] hold.
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